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Mailbag 
Man of the people? 
If President Donald Trump is a 
man of the people, as he claimed in 
his inaugural address, why is he get-
ting rid of Dodd-Frank banking regu-
lations. 
Dodd-Frank was enacted after 
the horrendous banking debacle of 
2007-08 when banks made too many 
dubious Joans. It requires banks to 
maintain a bigger 
cushion of cash in 
the event that more 
loans go worse 
than they antici-
pate. Also banks 
have stricter re-
porting require-
ments and are sub-
ject to audits to determine their abil-
ity to withstand adverse financial 
events. So what is wrong with that? 
Do we want a repeat of the near col-
lapse of the whole economy caused 
by bad lending? Do we think large 
banks have learned what can hap-
pen to our entire financial system 
due to over-leveraging? Do we think 
large banks are looking out for our 
best interests and our country's best 
interest? 
I don't think removal of Dodd-
Frank regulations is in the best in-
terest of the people and the country. 
Also, President Trump issued a 
directive removing the requirement 
that financial advisers look out for 
the best interests of their clients. 
What is going on here? I can only 
think that the financial interests are 
dominant here. Do you want your fi-
nancial adviser looking out for his or 
her best interests rather than your 




ON FEB. 12, 1992, six days be-
fore the New Hampshire primary, a 
letter Bill Clinton wrote to his draft 
board during the Vietnam War is re-
leased. Saturation news coverage of 
how Clinton avoided the draft threat-
ens his campaign. 
Trump hopped on the co~spiracy train, according to traffic . 
Politico, telling a gathering of 10 senators in Wash- SEE BURNS 03 SEE FAME03 
tionate attention to stars whethe r-
Textualism and originalism in constitutional interpretation 
AP 
Supreme Court Justice nominee Nell Gorsuch (right) meets with Sen. 
Roy Blunt, a Missouri Republlcan, In Washington on Friday. 
A Little Perspective 
CHRIS CILLIZZA, WRITING IN THE WASH-
INGTON POST: "To Trump, it was an open-and-shut 
case: He was the president. The president is tasked 
with keeping the country safe. This ban would keep 
the country safe. The appeals court didn't see it that 
way, leaving Trump with the very real possibility that 
even an appeal to the Supreme Court will change 
nothing. Remember that the Supreme Court is di-
vided between four more-lib-
eral justices and four more-
conservative ones. The ninth 
seat ls open as a result of the 
death of Antonin Scalia and the 
blockade Republicans put up 
on then-President Barack 
Obama's nomination of Mer-
rick Garland. Trump court 
nominee Neil Gorsuch is in the 
very early stages of the process and wouldn't be 
seated- even if he is eventually confirmed - in time 
to break the tie. And a tie would mean the ruling of 
the appeals court would hold - and Trump's travel 
ban would be no more. That's a big deal for a man 
who promised during the 2016 campaign that he 
could change everything that people hated about 
Washington, bringing his business savvy to its 
bloated bureaucracy. What Trump ls learning - or 
should learn - from this latest court ruling is that the 
government isn't like a business in one critical way: 






inalist judge in the 
mold of Justice 
Scalia seeks to ap-
ply the "original 
public meaning" of 
a constitutional pro-
vision. The original 










nated him to serve 
on the Supreme 
Court, it is impor-
tant to understand 
the approach 
Judge Gorsuch fa-
Constitutional Connections how a reasonable 
vors. 
Justice Scalia maintained that, 
when a judge interprets a demo-
and reasonably 
well-informed 
member of the public alive at the 
time the provision was enacted 
SEE CONSTITUTION 03 
There are checks and balances built into the system. 
The judiciary is not something he can control or ca-
jole. He is, quite literally, not the boss of the federal 
court system." 
-,p 
Tallptlng, an Ivy Lea..,_ custom that Is spreading, becomes the gathering place for famlly 
and friends before the football game at Dartmouth College In Hanover on Nov. 10, 1970. 
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Textualism-originalism comes in more than one form and flavor 
CONSTITUTION FROM D 1 
would have understood it to 
apply in circumstances like 
those facing the judge. 
A judge applying this 
method understands the in-
stitution of judicial review -
our accepted practice of giv-
ing judges final say on consti-
tutional meaning - to confer 
only a backward-looking in-
terpretive power. Constitu-
tional provisions are time-
dated; they mean today noth-
ing more or less than what 
they meant when they be-
came the law of the land. 
Proponents of this textual-
ist-originalist approach say 
that it reinforces our consti-
tutional separation of powers. 
In Article III of the Constitu-
tion, the Founders created a 
federal judiciary that would 
pronounce what the law is by 
ascertaining what the law 
was when enacted. And in 
Article I, the Founders cre-
ated a legislative body 
(Congress) to prescribe what 
the law wiU be in the future. 
These roles are to be kept 
separate and distinct. 
Proponents also say that 
this approach reinforces the 
democratic foundations of our 
constitutional order. When 
judges find some law or prac-
tice unconstitutional, they 
halt or delegitimize the work 
of a politically accountable 
branch. This is acceptable in 
a democracy only when the 
textual basis for the judicial 
intervention is a superior 
source of democratically-en-
acted law (i.e., the Constitu-
tion) understood l>y its enac-
tors to mean what the judges 
say that it means. 
If the italicized qualifica-
tion ·in the previous sentence 
is disregarded, proponents 
say, the practice of judicial re-
view inevitably results in 
judges prescribing new limi-
tations on government power 
that have not been authorized 
by the people. What's more, 
these new limitations are be-
yond the power of the peo-
pie's representatives to 
change because they are 
(supposedly) rooted in the 
Constitution. 
This is judicial tyranny, 
proponents say. The Constitu-
tion does not authorize 
judges to create new consti-
tutional law through the prac-
tice of judicial review. Rather, 
the Constitution authorizes 
the people to create new con-
stitutional law through the 
strictamendnlentprocesses 
specified in Article V. The 
Constitution should not be 
easy to amend. 
Many judges and theorists 
have strongly challenged Jus-
tice Scalia's approach to con-
stitutional interpretation. One 
such challenge, advanced by 
prominent constitutional law 
scholar Ronald Dworkin, is 
particularly interesting. 
Dworkin accepted Justice 
Scalia's textuallst and origi-
nalist premises but applied 
them to reach very different 
conclusions. 
Crucially, Dworkin re-
jected Justice Scalia's asser-
tion the original public mean-
ing of a constitutional provi-
sion must be construed in a 
time-dated manner. In 
Dworkin's view, the people of 
the founding generation 
would have expected future 
generations to reinterpret the 
majestic but (mostly) ambigu-
ous generalities of the Consti-
tution so as to make them 
their own. 
Consider, for example, the 
Eighth Amendnlent's ban on 
"cruel and unusual punish-
ments." Why, Dworkin asked, 
should we understand the 
Founders to have banned 
only punishments thought 
cruel and unusual in 1791 
(when the Eighth Amend-
ment was ratified)? Isn't it 
more plausible to think that 
the Founders, who believed in 
self-governance and abhorred 
distant and hierarchical 
power structures, would have 
wanted future generations to 
infuse this vague provision 
with contemporary under-
standings? 
So construed, the Eighth 
Amendnlent's ban on "cruel 
and unusual punishments" 
does not merely prohibit pun-
ishments thought cruel and 
unusual in 1791; it prohibits 
punishments thought cruel 
and unusual today. Thus, a 
principled textualist-original-
ist judge could plausibly con-
clude (as the Supreme Court 
has concluded) that adnlinis-
tration of the death penalty 
for crimes other than murder 
is now unconstitutional even 
though, in 1791, the death 
penalty was regularly im-
posed for lesser crimes. 
Proponents of this type of 
textualism-originalism say 
that it is superior to Justice 
Scalia's approach for at least 
two reasons. 
F1irst, as just explained, it 
is more faithful to the (likely) 
original understanding that 
the Constitution should re-
flect the American people's 
contemporary values. Sec-
ond, and relatedly, it makes 
the Constitution a "living" 
Constitution that is more 
likely to function well in a plu-
ralistic and rapidly changing 
world. 
In a 2015 lecture at Har-
vard Law School, Supreme 
Court Justice Elena Kagan 
paid homage to Justice Scalia 
by saying "we're all textual-
ists now." As this statement 
shows, Justice Scalia's textu-
alist-originalist interpretive 
approach has had a profound 
impact on American law. And 
it appears that Judge Gor-
such is prepared to pick up 
the torch and carry it for-
ward. But it is important to 
understand that textualism-
originalism comes in more 
than one form and flavor. 
(John Greabe teaches con-
stitutional law and related 
subjects at the University of 
New Hampshire School of 
Law. He $0 serves on the 
board of trustees of the New 
Hampshire Institute for 
Civics Education. ) 
All Trump stands for is his own self-promotion and wealth 
FAME FROM Dl 
they are on TV or in movies, 
or play music or sports. As a 
TV star for years and as . 
someone who worked hard at 
staying in the public eye, 
Trump had no problem with 
name recognition. He had 
been a character in Doones-
bury for 30 years. For many 
candidates, just becoming 
known is a major challenge. 
Trump knew that being a 
celebrity was also a way to 
sell his brand. Celebrity is 
fundamentally a marketing 
tool. Doubters should check 
out the massive literature on 
celebrity branding. 
Association of stars with a 
brand is a primary way to 
make the brand more popular 
and sometimes edgy. In 
Trump's case, he used his 
celebrity to sell himself like a 
commodity. Mixed into the 
campaign was his selling of 
Trump steaks, wines, golf 
courses and hotels . 
.. 
ing and benevolence. By 2091, 
fame came in first, followed by 
achievement, image, popular-
ity and financial success. By 
2007, in the aspirati<mal value 
ranking, community feeling 
fell to 11th place and benevo-
lence was 12th out of the 16 
values ranked. In 1997, fame 
had been 15th out of 16. 
A 2006 survey from the 
Pew Research Center aimed 
at 18- to 25-year-olds found 
that 51 percent cited being fa-
mous as either the first or 
second most important life 
goal for their generation. 
In citing this study and 
survey, I certainly do not in-
tend to single out young peo-
ple as the only ones enamored 
of fame and celebrity. This 
trend includes all age groups. 
The writer George Monbiot 
has written that the principal 
qualities in a celebrity are va-
pidity, vacuity and physical 
beauty. 
Trump embodies the vacu-
ous nature Qf celebri . His ca-
